The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 imposes a Renewable Fuel Standard met through a combination of corn and cellulosic ethanol. A variety of rationales support this policy including the recycling of atmospheric carbon. This study examines the economic dimensions of this problem focusing on the role of zero prices for environmental goods and the use of an environmental equivalent. When environmental goods are taken into account, the optimal price policy cannot be defined with certainty.
Introduction
The Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) introduced in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 draws support from a wide array of policy goals. Among the most prominent are the support the RFS provides for agricultural prices largely through the increased demand for corn and the potential environmental benefits of biofuels. The later includes the possible effect of carbon recycling. Specifically, the production of ethanol implies that carbon removed from the atmosphere can be used to replace incremental carbon that would be produced from oil. This contention has been the subject of significant debate in the guise of the carbon cycle [1] . However, the economic impacts of these potential environmental effects can be developed within the context of a general equilibrium model.
The value of removing atmospheric carbon is problematic (that is true with many environmental goods) since no market price exists for this environmental amenity since it is not traded in an identified market. One view is that a zero price for the environmental good implies that it is in equilibrium if the excess supply of the environmental good is less than zero, or the supply of the environmental amenity exceeds the demand. The contrasting view is that the typical market demand for these environmental goods exceeds the observed market demand for a variety of reasons (i.e., the free-rider problem where consumption is nonexclusionary). Hence, the existing zero price for these environmental goods understates their scarcity in the economy. In case of biofuels, the zero value of the reduction in atmospheric carbon could imply market failure. Under the RFS, this market failure could be reduced by including a value for atmospheric carbon (i.e., the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit [VEETC] which expired in 2012 provided a mechanism to correct such a market failure). This study develops this tradeoff within the context of a general equilibrium model. In addition, we discuss the implications of market failure using the concept of an environmental equivalent (the amount of benefit that the economy must receive from an environmental policy to yield a benefit cost ratio of one) introduced by Schmitz, Kennedy, and Hill Gabriel [2] .
Standard Formulation of the General Equilibrium
Consider the standard formulation of the applied general equilibrium model where there exists a numerical set of prices { } , p w (where p is the price of outputs or consumables and w is the price of the household's endowments or factors of production) can be found such that all the excess demand relationships
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y p w k is the supply curves for each good, and
k p w k is the demand for the factors of production l k . Applied work models such as GEMPACK [3] and GTAP [4] expand the formulation to allow for intermediate outputs. Specifically, as depicted in Figure 1 , some of the factors of production are used to produce intermediate products that are then used by other firms to produce final outputs. In this configuration, the factor endowments ( )
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, , , , , , y p p w is the level of consumption good i supplied for a given set of input and output prices.
The results in Equations (2) and (3) provide a slightly more expansive set of general equilibrium conditions
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Expanding the conditions in Equation (4) yields
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incorporating the complementary slackness conditions (i.e., negative excess demands imply non-positive prices).
Zero Prices and Environmental Goods
Consider both consumption and production uses of environmental goods. We build on the complementary slackness conditions in Equation (5) by dividing the set of all resource endowments into two groups 1
Thus, group 1 L are priced factors of production while 2 L are unpriced factors of production. If we ignore the degeneracies (i.e., those points where both the price and the excess demand are both zero), the general equilibrium solution implies that
or in the general equilibrium solution the economy has more of a particular factor endowment than required to maximize society's utility. The typical goods cited as an example of Equation (6) are sunlight, seawater, or possibly atmospheric nitrogen. These factor endowments do not constrain production. However, it is possible that some of the zero priced goods do not fall in this category because of consumption market failures where non-negative excess demand exists at a zero price.
To develop this concept more completely, consider a slight modification to Equation (6 denotes the demand for a consumption good associated with a factor endowment (i.e., clean air or water, or possibly carbon recycling). Thus, a general equilibrium solution would require a negative excess demand in Equation (7) given that the associated price is equal to zero-or that the price of the environmental endowment equals zero. The concept behind the failure of environmental markets is that ( ) , , ,
is the true demand curve. As depicted in Figure 2 , the observed market equilibrium for factor 2 l implies that 
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